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BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON NIGHTCLUB
ILLEGALITY TO THE NEVADA GAMING
CONTROL BOARD AND NEVADA’S
COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS
Robert Loftus
I. INTRODUCTION
Dana’s life is enviable. Take her job for example. Dana’s job is at a
popular Las Vegas nightclub where Dana was chosen from hundreds of
applicants and is able to walk home with a car payment’s worth of tips on a
nightly basis.1 However, in its grandeur, Dana’s job does have a dark side; a
side that pits her job security against doing the right thing. Specifically, Dana
routinely witnesses her employer engage in criminal conduct—the lucrative
solicitation and distribution of drugs and prostitution—and, thus, wishes that
she could do something to prevent it. Dana, though, conscious that she is
expendable because there are hundreds of individuals desperately waiting for
her job, is scared that she will lose her at-will job if she takes any action against
her employer’s criminal conduct. This scenario unfortunately occurs often in
the Las Vegas nightclub industry and consequently puts nightclub employees in
a precarious position because of Nevada’s underdeveloped retaliation laws in
the nightclub industry.
A. Brief Overview
Although employees are generally knowledgeable that there are certain
protections afforded under federal statutes such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), in addition to state statutory protections such as Nevada’s
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“NVOSHA”), employees, as well as
practitioners, find themselves unfamiliar with how to properly effectuate
private sector whistleblower protections under the umbrella of Nevada’s
See Monica Kim, A Day in the Life of a Vegas Cocktail Waitress, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/conde-nasttraveler/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-ve_b_3790194.html.
1
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gaming industry.
The general rule in employment law is that employers may fire their
employees at any time—for any reason or no reason at all—under what is
known as the at-will employment doctrine.2 However, in the past half-century,
many exceptions to the general rule have emerged.3 For example,
whistleblower protections, one form of retaliation protection laws, typically
originate from two sources: (1) legislatures (federal and state), which enact
statutory protections, or (1) courts, which modify and make common law
protections.4
Statutory protections, both federal and state, tend to be specific, addressing
certain subject areas.5 Typically, statutory protections covering retaliation
against whistleblowing arise when employees participate in protected activities
(usually filing a complaint or testifying) under laws in the following areas:
“compensation, discrimination, lie detectors, and occupational safety and
health.”6 Yet, as with other areas of law, legislators often lack the foresight to
address every possible variable in a retaliatory situation.
“Common law protections, on the other hand, tend to ‘fill the gaps’ where
no statute exists for a given situation.”7 Indeed, though, even Nevada’s
common law protections fail to properly provide nightclub employees notice of
when whistleblower protections are triggered because of Nevada’s
underdeveloped retaliation laws.
Specifically, in Nevada, an employer may not discharge an employee for a
reason that violates an established public policy of Nevada.8 Nevada’s
common law “distinguishe[s] between cases in which an employee is asked by
[her] employer to participate in conduct [that violates] public policy (refusal
case[s]) and those [cases] in which the employee merely discovers that [her]
employer is engaged in illegal conduct and reports” her employer’s conduct
that violates public policy (whistleblower cases).9 However, like Dana
mentioned above, an employee cannot receive whistleblower protection by
simply reporting to just anyone. In fact, it is imperative for employees like

MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 910 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
3
Id. at 31.
4
Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending A More
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1638 (2008).
5
See id.
6
Your Rights Filing a Whistleblower or Retaliation Claim – Nevada, WORKPLACE
FAIRNESS (2016), http://www.workplacefairness.org/whistleblower-retaliationclaim-NV [hereinafter Workplace Rights].
7
Id.
8
Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 369 (Nev. 1989); see also Allum v.
Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Nev. 1998).
9
Martin v. Papillon Airways, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164–65 (D. Nev. 2011),
as amended (Feb. 1, 2012).
2
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Dana, in order to receive protection under Nevada’s common law, to report
their employer’s criminal conduct to a proper outside authority.10
Hence, the question becomes, who or what qualifies as a proper outside
authority for Dana to receive protection; because if Dana reports her
employer’s illegal conduct to an organization that Nevada courts do not
consider a proper outside authority, Dana will have jeopardized, if not thrown
away, her highly prized job in pursuit of upholding Nevada’s public policies.
Unfortunately, although the nightclub industry has expanded exponentially
in Nevada to become a significant revenue generator for casinos and,
consequently, supplies jobs to thousands of Nevadans, Nevada’s case law lacks
precedent to inform nightclub employees, like Dana, as to which outside
authorities would qualify under common law whistleblower protections.
Specifically, for the purposes of this article, the issue is whether a nightclub
employee is protected under Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections
if the employee reports her employer’s conduct that violates Nevada’s public
policy to the Nevada Gaming Control Board (“Board”), an outside regulatory
authority.
The problem is that 1) nightclub jobs are unique in the aspect that the
employers are often third party vendors of casinos and, therefore, maintain
some autonomy from the casino, and 2) nightclubs tend to lack gaming within
the nightclub venue that would directly subject the nightclub to the Board’s
governance.11 However, the Nevada Legislature has endowed the Board with
broad reaching powers to protect the general welfare of Nevada through the
oversight of casinos and the operations conducted on casino property.12 Thus,
with its broad powers, the Board has, within the last six years, started holding
casinos individually responsible for illegal conduct that has transpired within a
nightclub that is located on a casino’s premises and has, correspondingly,
issued fines to both the nightclub and casino.13
As such, the Board’s enforcement conduct, coupled with its formal
announcements, signals that nightclub employers, as third party vendors
operating out of casinos, are beholden to the gaming laws and regulations
promulgated by Nevada’s Legislature and executive agencies and, thus, are
subject to the Board’s investigative and enforcement arms.14 Yet, in the face of
such integrated business relationships between casinos and nightclubs, and the
Board’s regulation of the illegal activities transpiring within casino nightclubs,
Nevada’s case law is not clear on whether an employee of a non-gaming third

See Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989).
Glenn Light et al., Keeping Compliance in Check, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT.
12 (November 2009), http://www.lrrlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/LightRut
Sing_1109.pdf.
12
See infra Part II.C.2.
13
See infra Part II.C.3.
14
Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2.
10
11
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party vendor, such as a nightclub, would be protected by whistleblower
protections if the employee reported her employer’s illegal conduct to the
Board.
Accordingly, this article will briefly discuss the at-will doctrine and the
general development of whistleblower protections. Thereafter, this article will
focus specifically on Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections and
analyze its underlying public policy exception. Ultimately, though, as the
extremely profitable nightclub industry continues to operate and grow as third
party vendors of casinos, this article will position the argument that an
employee of a nightclub that is operating in a casino, regardless of whether the
nightclub is owned directly by a casino or operates as an independent nongaming entity, who reports her employer’s criminal conduct to the Board
should receive whistleblowing protections under Nevada’s common law
protections.
II. DISCUSSION
As prefaced above, this article addresses Nevada’s common law
whistleblower protections in the face of the rapidly changing casino and
gaming industry. Both Nevada and Las Vegas have traditionally been known
as the gaming capital of the world; however, as of recently, Las Vegas has
reinvented itself in light of declining gaming revenue as a premier nightclub
destination—essentially creating an economic entertainment powerhouse.15 To
illustrate, as of 2013, Las Vegas was home to seven of the top ten revenuegrossing nightclubs in the United States.16 These clubs can independently gross
upwards to $90 million annually in revenue while only operating two to three
nights a week.17 Thus, with money flowing in hand over fist, nightclubs are a
lightning rod for employment prospects as these nightclubs offer quick money
for employees in the form of tips that can range from hundreds to thousands of
dollars on a nightly basis, which is in addition to an employee’s hourly
wages.18
Since its inception, the Board, concerned about the vibrancy of the gaming
industry, and Nevada’s dependent economy, regulated the gaming related
conduct of casinos.19 Thus, because of the Board’s oversight, casino
Associated Press, What Happened to the Roulette Tables? The $1,300 Bottles of
Vodka and World-Famous DJs in Clubs the Size of Football Fields that Are
Keeping Vegas Afloat as Gambling Declines, DAILY MAIL (May 6, 2013, 9:42
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2320061/Las-Vegas-Inside-night
clubs-size-football-fields-Sin-City-afloat-gambling-declines.html [hereinafter Daily
Mail Nightclub Article].
16
Top 100, NIGHTCLUB & BAR (2013), http://www.nightclub.com/top-100/2013nightclub-bar-top-100-list.
17
Id.
18
Kim, supra note 1.
19
See generally Lou Dorn, Casino Liability for Third Party Operations, NEV.
15
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employees were able to report their employer’s illegal activities without fear of
reprise under Nevada’s whistleblower protections.20 However, with the instant
success of Las Vegas’ rebranding into a nightclub destination, the question
looms as to whether an employee of a nightclub, which is integrated with a
casino, is protected by Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections if the
employee reports the illegal conduct of the nightclub to the Board.
A. At-Will Employment in Nevada
In Nevada, like most states, an employer generally has the liberty to fire an
at-will employee for any reason or for no reason at all.21 More articulately
defined, at-will employment means that an employer may terminate an
employee at any time for any reason, except an illegal one, or for no reason at
all without incurring legal liability.22 Likewise, at-will employees are free to
leave their employer at any time, with exceptions such as fulfilling contractual
obligations, for any reason, or no reason at all, without legal ramifications.23
This definition of the at-will relationship, in its simple form, demonstrates one
of the strongest benefits to both employer and employee: the freedom of
choice.24 Essentially, at-will employment allows an employer the freedom to
choose which employees it believes are most beneficial to its enterprise and,
similarly, allows employees freedom to choose the job that most closely aligns
with their personal, unique situations. However, as briefly touched upon, there
are exceptions to at-will employment.
1. Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine
Over the years, through the development of statutory and common-law
protections, courts have carved exceptions to the at-will doctrine in recognition
of the importance of protecting an employee’s livelihood from unjust
termination.25 Statutory protections focus mostly on acts of the employer that

GAMING LAW. (Sept. 2012), http://nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/GamingLaw
_2012_Third_Party_Operations.pdf.
20
See generally Ron Dicker, Douglas A. Poppa, Former Riviera Casino Worker,
Fired for Reporting Rigged Game, Lawsuit Claims, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 16, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/douglaspoppa-riviera-casino-rigged-slot-machine-lawsuit_n_2480626.html; see also Nick
Divito, Vegas Casino Rigged Game, Security Man Says, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:20 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/01/15
/53919.htm.
21
See Smith v. Cladianos, 752 P.2d 233, 234 (Nev. 1988).
22
See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 910.
23
Id.
24
See James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 235 (2007).
25
The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-
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involve illegal discrimination or acts of retaliation.26 Common law exceptions,
depending on the jurisdiction, will protect an employee if the employer violates
an implied contract, does not act in good faith and fair dealing, or violates
public policy.27 However, even as the protections afforded under statutory
frameworks and the common law vary in scope, both statutory and common
law exceptions to the at-will doctrine protect whistleblowers.
2. Whistleblower Protections
Whistleblowing, simply defined, is when an employee reports alleged or
true wrongdoing within her organization, recognized in both the private and
public sector, to internal or outside authorities.28 Thus, as employees are most
knowledgeable about their workplace, they are not only in the best position to
report such violations, but they are sometimes the only ones who report
wrongdoing or illegal conduct.29
i. Statutory Whistleblower Protections
a. Federal Statutory Whistleblower Protections
There are numerous federal statutes that protect against whistleblowing;
however, the statutory protections are narrowly crafted and target specific areas
of law.30 One example is the labor protections under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act seeks to prohibit employers abuse or
exploitation of employees by establishing substantive wage, hour, and overtime
standards.31 Thus, an employee who makes a formal complaint specifically
about her employer’s violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act is protected
under statutory whistleblower protections.32
b. Nevada’s Statutory Whistleblower Protections
Like the federal whistleblower statutes, “the Nevada Legislature has

overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter At-Will Presumption and
Exceptions].
26
See infra Part II.A.2.i.b.
27
At-Will Presumption and Exceptions, supra note 25.
28
Stefan Rützel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the
Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 1, 1 (1995).
29
Id. at 2.
30
See generally Federal Whistleblower Protections, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR,
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81
6&Itemid=129 (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
31
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333
(2011); see generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C § 201 (2014).
32
See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333.
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[crafted] narrow statutory protections for certain activities.”33 As previously
stated, employees traditionally trigger statutory whistleblower protections when
they “engage in protected activities (usually filing a complaint or testifying)
under laws” designed to protect employees from retaliation.34
Examples include protections afforded for claims pertaining to Nevada’s
False Claims Act, wage and hour issues, and discrimination issues.35 For
instance, under Nevada’s False Claims Act, whistleblowers are protected when
they bring suit in the name of the state of Nevada where an individual engages
in conduct that defrauds the government of taxpayer dollars.36 Similar to
protections afforded under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in Nevada, an
employee may not be discharged or penalized in retaliation for testifying in an
investigation or proceeding that concerns the enforcement of Nevada’s
compensation, wages, and hours laws.37 These laws cover such topics as
minimum wage, overtime compensation requirements, and meal and rest
periods.38 In regards to discriminatory practices, an employer may not
discharge or discriminate against an employee in retaliation for opposing or
reporting an employer’s unlawful discriminatory employment practice.39
Accordingly, like federal statutory protections, Nevada’s statutory protections
are triggered under specific circumstances.
ii. Nevada’s Common Law Protections
Like most states, in addition to statutory protections, Nevada also
recognizes a common law public policy exception to at-will employment
terminations.40 In Nevada, when an employer terminates an employee in
violation of public policy, the terminated employee may bring a cause of action
for the employer’s unlawful actions.41 Nevada courts deem such retaliatory
terminations as tortious discharges and classify the cases as either refusal cases
or whistleblower cases.42 The rationale behind these kinds of tort actions is that,
although an employer is free to dismiss an at-will employee under almost any
lawful circumstance, an employer is not entitled to dismiss an employee for a
reason that contravenes public policy.43 However, the Nevada Supreme Court
Workplace Rights, supra note 6.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 179 P.3d
556, 559 (Nev. 2008); see also Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 357.250 (2015).
37
See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 608.015 (2015).
38
See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. §§ 608.250; 608.018; 608.019 (2015).
39
See Nᴇᴠ. Rᴇᴠ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 613.340(1) (2015).
40
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882, 885 (Nev. 1999).
41
Id.
42
See Abbas v. Lucky Cab Co., No. 50904, 2009 WL 3191531, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 9,
2009).
43
See id.
33
34
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narrowly construes this exception to the at-will doctrine. In fact, since the first
recognition of common law retaliation protections in Wiltsie v. Baby Grand
Corp., the Nevada Supreme Court has created a judicial checklist that a
Plaintiff must satisfy in order to receive retaliation protections in both refusal
and whistleblower cases.44
a. Refusal Cases
As stated, there is a clear distinction under Nevada law between cases in
which an employee is asked by her employer to participate in conduct violative
of public policy and those in which the employee merely discovers that her
employer is engaged in illegal conduct and reports it to someone.45
In refusal cases, Nevada courts aim to protect employees who refuse to
engage in their employer’s conduct that violates the state’s public policy.46 For
example, an employer that requires its employee, who has an open surgical
wound, to work near cyanide would run counter to the state’s policy of
providing employees with a safe and healthy working environment.47
Accordingly, to promote this policy, an employee must feel free to object when
asked, for instance, to work in an unreasonably dangerous area without fear of
retaliation from her employer.48
Thus, under Nevada common law, in order to trigger retaliation protection
in a refusal case, an employer must terminate an employee because the
employee affirmatively objected to participating in her employer’s illegal
conduct, an action in direct contradiction to public policy.49
b. Whistleblowing
The Nevada Supreme Court established Nevada’s basic common law
retaliatory protection framework in Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp. and then
building upon that framework, Nevada’s common law whistleblower
protections emerged.
1. Wiltse v. Baby Grand Corp.
In Wiltsie, a discharged employee brought a wrongful termination claim
against his prior employer because the employer terminated the employee for
reporting his supervisor’s illegal conduct.50 In analyzing Nevada’s common

See infra Part II.A.2.ii.b.1.
See Abbas, 2009 WL 3191531 at *1.
46
Martin v. Papillon Airways, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (D. Nev. 2011), as
amended (Feb. 1, 2012).
47
D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 213–16 (Nev. 1991).
48
Id. at 216.
49
Martin, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
50
Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989).
44
45
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law whistleblower protections, the Nevada Supreme Court established the first
prong, which is to find that “firing an at-will employee for reporting illegal
conduct of his employer violates an established public policy of [Nevada].”51
The court then established the second prong, which requires an employee to
report illegal conduct to appropriate authorities and not merely act in a private
or proprietary manner by reporting internally within the organization.52
Unfortunately for the employee in Wiltsie, the Nevada Supreme Court found
that although he was trying to advance Nevada’s public policy through the
protection of Nevada’s gaming laws, he did not trigger whistleblower
protection because he did not report his employer’s conduct to an outside
authority.53
2. Public Policy
The political branches of government usually define public policy.54 For
example, “[w]hen a state’s legislature has enacted legislation that forbids
certain conduct,” courts hold that participating in the forbidden “conduct is
against public policy.”55
“[In determining] what constitutes public policy . . . courts look to statutes
and constitutional provisions to determine if a given practice has been endorsed
(e.g. the right to collect workers’ compensation benefits) or prohibited (e.g.
criminal laws prohibiting perjury).”56 So, as addressed above, if a Nevada
statute endorses an employee’s right to minimum wages and overtime
compensation, an employer who retaliates against an employee for invoking
that right would be contravening public policy.57 “On the other side of the same
coin, because criminal statutes prohibit perjury,” for example, “an employer
who coerces an employee to commit perjury by threats of reprisal is also
contravening Nevada’s public policy.”58
3. External Reporting with Intent to Disclose Illegal Conduct
As stated, the Nevada Supreme Court “believe[s] that whistleblowing
activities [that] serve[] a public purpose should be protected[,] [s]o long as [the
whistleblower’s] actions are not merely private or proprietary, but instead”
expose the employer to a proper external authority.59 Thus, Wiltsie is
Id.
Id.
53
Id. at 433–34.
54
Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984).
55
See Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311, 313 (D. Nev. 1985).
56
Workplace Rights, supra note 6; see e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687
(Cal. 1992), overruled by Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
57
See generally D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 21–18 (Nev. 1991).
58
Workplace Rights, supra note 6.
59
Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989).
51
52
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illustrative in the fact that whistleblower protections are not triggered if an
employee simply reports illegal conduct internally to a supervisor.60
Under Ainsworth v. Newmont Min. Corp., the Nevada Supreme Court
reaffirmed their stance that the employer’s illegal conduct must be reported to
an outside government authority and also clarified that the individual seeking
retaliation protection must have affirmatively sought to notify the external
authority of its employer’s illegal conduct.61 In Ainsworth, the Nevada Supreme
Court denied whistleblower protections because nothing in the evidentiary
record indicated that the employee engaged in an affirmative action to expose
her employer’s wrongful conduct outside of an ambiguous conversation with a
governmental employee.62 “In fact, when asked in her deposition whether she
‘ever filed a formal complaint of violation with any governmental authority
while she was working for Newmont,’” Plaintiff answered in the negative.63
Accordingly, “[t]he essence of the Wiltsie public policy exception is that the
employee must take affirmative action and contact the appropriate authorities—
must blow the whistle—to ‘expose illegal or unsafe practices’.”64
4. Reporting to the Correct Authoritative Body
The final hurdle to receive Nevada’s common law whistleblower
protections involves reporting the employer’s illegal conduct to the correct
external governmental body. This is an essential step, as the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada has held that reporting to just any
external governmental body does not trigger Nevada’s whistleblower
protections.65
In Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., terminated airline pilots sued their
employer for, among other causes of action, retaliatory discharge in violation of
Nevada public policy.66 The employees argued that they complied with Wiltsie
because they reported their employer’s safety violations to the National
Mediation Board, an external government agency that mediates disputes
between employees and employers on issues such as rates of pay and working
conditions.67 The court, in applying Nevada law, held that the employees
presented nothing that would “indicate[] that, by any stretch of the imagination,
the [National Mediation Board] is the ‘appropriate authority’ to report alleged

Id. at 433–34.
Ainsworth v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 56250, 2012 WL 987222, at *2 (Nev.
Mar. 20, 2012).
62
Id. at *2–3.
63
Id. at *2.
64
Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (D. Nev. 1992) vacated
in part, Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 666 (D. Nev. 1994).
65
See id. at 1504.
66
Id. at 1495.
67
Id. at 1503–04.
60
61
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safety violations.”68 Clearly, as the court positioned, the appropriate external
authority charged with prosecuting those violations would have been the
Federal Aviation Administration.69 Accordingly, the court did not grant
whistleblower protections.
5. Possible External Authorities for Nightclub Employees
Thus, at this point, the question must be raised again as to what appropriate
external authority is charged with prosecuting illegal violations that transpire in
Las Vegas nightclubs? The typical illegal activities that transpire within
nightclubs and day clubs involve the solicitation and distribution of narcotics
and prostitution.70
First, there is the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“Las Vegas
Metro”). Specifically, Las Vegas Metro’s “Narcotics Section is responsible for
suppressing and investigating . . . drug-related crimes includ[ing], but [] not
limited to, arresting and prosecuting individuals involved in major narcotic
offenses; including trafficking, manufacturing, smuggling, and clandestine lab
activities.”71 In addition, Las Vegas Metro’s Vice division is responsible for
investigating vice-related crimes, including arresting and prosecuting
prostitutes, their clients, and pandering suspects, prostitution-related larcenies,
and businesses that front for prostitution.72
Second, but less certain because of its lack of prosecutorial functions, there
is the Nevada Department of Public Safety’s Investigation Division. Through
Nevada Revised Statutes 480.400 through 480.520 and 453.271, the Nevada
Legislature mandated that the Nevada Department of Public Safety conduct
controlled substance investigations and provide criminal investigative services
to state, county and local law enforcement agencies upon request.73 The
Department of Public Safety’s Investigation Division “collects, analyzes and
disseminates information concerning organized crime, controlled substance
violators, missing persons, unidentified bodies and domestic violence.”74
Lastly, there is the Nevada Gaming Control Board.75 As the Nevada
Id. at 1504.
Id. at 1505.
70
See Howard Stutz, Las Vegas Hotel-Casino Operators Told to Stamp Out Illegal
Activities, L.V. REV.-J. (Mar. 22, 2013, 2:03 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com
/business/tourism/las-vegas-hotel-casino-operators-told-stamp-out-illegal-activities.
71
Narcotics Section, L.V. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/
Sections/Vice/tabid/449/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
72
Vice, L.V. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/Sections/Vice
/tabid/190/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
73
Overview of the DPS Investigation Division, NEV. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY INVESTIGATION DIV., http://id.dps.nv.gov/about/Investigation_Division/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
74
Id.
75
Where the Nevada Gaming Control Board would be an external authority in the
68
69
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Supreme Court asserted in Wiltsie, “[n]o public policy is more basic than the
enforcement of our gaming laws.”76 Thus, in 1955, the Nevada Legislature
“created the [Board] within the Nevada Tax Commission, whose purpose was
to inaugurate a policy to eliminate the undesirable elements in Nevada gaming
and to provide regulations for the licensing and the operation of gaming.”77
Specifically, the Board, organized under Nevada Revised Statute 463, serves as
an administrative agency of the state of Nevada and is charged with the
administration and enforcement of the gaming laws of the state.78
Thus, with its broad reaching powers over the gaming industry and casino
licensees, the Board has within the last six years began a regulatory campaign
against the illegal conduct in both nightclubs owned by the casinos and
nightclubs operating as third-party vendors located within casinos.79 However,
before the Board’s regulation over nightclubs is addressed, and what
implications that entails for whistleblower protections, it is important to take a
cursory look at the development of the casino business model in Las Vegas.
B. The Evolution of Las Vegas’ Casino Model
“In 1941 the El Rancho Vegas resort opened on a section of U.S.
[highway] just outside of [Las Vegas’] jurisdiction.”80 Thereafter, “other hotelcasinos soon followed, and the section of highway became known as ‘the
Strip.’”81 Then, twenty years later, precipitated by the acquisition of hotels by
Howard Hughes, the Strip became the interest of corporate conglomerates.82
Fast-forward yet again to the 1980s, Steve Wynn opened the Mirage, Las
Vegas’ first mega-resort.83 Starting with the Mirage, “over the next two
decades the strip was transformed yet again: Old casinos were dynamited to
make room for massive complexes taking their aesthetic cues from ancient
Rome and Egypt, Paris, Venice, New York and other glamorous escapes.”84
With gaming tax rates up to 50% in some states, casinos can generate

context of addressing illegal violations that transpire in Las Vegas nightclubs that
are housed within a gaming establishment, as contrasted against independent
freestanding nightclubs that would not fall within the purview of the Nevada
Gaming Control Board’s authority.
76
Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989).
77
About Us, NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD., http://gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx?
page=2 (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
78
See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 463 (2015).
79
See infra Part II.C.3.
80
Las Vegas, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/las-vegas/print (last visited
Apr. 13, 2016).
81
Id.
82
See id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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hundreds of millions in state revenues.85 Accordingly, states are using casinos
at an increased pace to generate government revenues to pay for schools,
universities, transportation, and public safety.86 For example, “during fiscal
year 2014, more than $2.0 billion in taxes and fees were paid by Nevada hotelcasino operators. This included major contributions to Nevada’s three largest
sources of revenue: sales tax, property tax and gaming tax.”87 “Nevada hotel
casinos account for [more than] $1.4 billion, or approximately 45 percent of
[s]tate [g]eneral [f]und [tax] revenues—more than any other industry.”88 Thus,
it is no wonder why the Nevada Supreme Court asserted that “[n]o public
policy is more basic than the enforcement of our gaming laws.89
Because of gambling and the casino industry as a whole, Las Vegas has
shown impressive job growth throughout the years and has developed into a
major city player with a low tax burden on its citizens.90 In fact, “large tax
contributions by the tourism and gaming industry allow Nevada’s residents and
businesses to enjoy among the lowest tax burdens in the nation.”91 However,
although gaming has played a major economic role in Las Vegas, the
prominence of the Las Vegas gaming institution and its related benefits have
shown signs that, going forward, Las Vegas cannot survive on gaming revenue
alone.
1. Gaming Decline
In the 1990s, approximately 60 percent of a Las Vegas resorts’ revenue
came from gambling.92 Thus, with the revenue that gaming generated for
Nevada, it was important for the Board to help insure the image of Nevada’s
gaming and casino industry for return and future visitors. However, with the
rise of Macau off the coast of China as the premier gambling location in the
world, gambling locations opening around the United States, and the changing
spending habits of millennials, as of 2013, gaming revenue for casinos fell just
short of 37 percent.93 Tellingly, new casino projects announced are eschewing

Jackson Brainerd, 2015 Casino Tax and Expenditures, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG.
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce
/casino-tax-and-expenditures-2013.aspx.
86
Id.
87
How Gaming Benefits Nevada, NEV. RESORT ASS’N, http://nevadaresorts.org
/benefits/taxes.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
88
Id.
89
Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 1989).
90
See How Gaming Benefits Nevada, supra note 87.
91
Id.
92
Dave Berns & Cy Ryan, Gambling Makes Up Smallest Chunk Ever of Casino
Revenue, VEGASINC (Jan. 6, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/
business/real-estate/2012/jan/06/shift-spending-gambling-continues-state-reports/.
93
Daily Mail Nightclub Article, supra note 15; see Christopher Palmeri, Local
Casinos Are a Losing Bet, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:51 PM),
85
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the traditional slot player base that built the modern Strip and are focusing on
premium nightclubs, dining, and retail to attract the new Las Vegas tourist
crowd.94
2. Rise of the Money Machine, the Las Vegas Nightclub
“In 1995, when the movie ‘Casino’ hit theaters, keeping gamblers playing
was the cardinal rule in Las Vegas, but that’s no longer the case.”95 In the not
too distant past, visitors enjoyed a nightclub that boasted booze, food, and basic
lounge entertainment before such patrons headed off into the casino to spend
their money.96 Now, visitors—products of the digital age—come to Las Vegas
with pockets full of cash and plastic, ready to spends hundreds, if not
thousands, of dollars on liquor and the chance to listen to famous DJs play at
nightclubs, with spending money on gaming as a second thought.97 In fact, “it
is now common for visitors to Las Vegas to skip gambling [altogether] and
instead” spend their money on one of the many popular, and expensive, multilevel nightclubs that feature “popular touring DJs and celebrities, lasers, high
tech lighting, LED walls, and confetti cannons.”98
Over the years, Las Vegas nightclubs evolved into mega-clubs.99 First, the
Palms opened Rain in 2001 with 26,000 square feet.100 Thereafter, Caesar’s
opened Pure in 2004 at 36,000 square feet, followed by XS with 40,000 square
feet at the Encore, and then Marquee with 60,000 square feet at the
Cosmopolitan.101 As these clubs continue to expand in size, their revenues also
continue to expand northward.102 Shockingly, although these clubs are
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-03/casinos-close-as-revenue-fallsin-gambling-saturated-u-dot-s (explaining the proliferation of new casinos opening
outside of Nevada); see also When Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet for Las Vegas, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2015, 7:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/las-vegas-casinosreinventing-the-strip-to-attract-new-generation/ [hereinafter Gambling Isn’t a Sure
Bet].
94
Hannah Dreier, Las Vegas Clubs Help Casinos Offset Declines in Gambling,
Attract Younger Audience, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2013, 4:46 PM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20141228215642/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201
3/05/06/las-vegas-clubs-replace-casinos_n_3225061.html.
95
Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet, supra note 93.
96
Tovin Lapan, Nightclubs Are the New Cash Registers at Strip Casinos, L.V. SUN
(Mar. 28, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/28/clubsincreasingly-center-attention-strip/.
97
Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet, supra note 93; See generally Ashley Powers, Las
Vegas Clubs Get Slapped for Bad Behavior, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/19/nation/na-vegas-clubs19.
98
Las Vegas Scans - What’s New in Las Vegas, CASENET (July 6, 2015),
http://casenet.com/concert/lvscan.htm.
99
Lapan, supra note 96.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
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typically open only two to three nights a week, they can generate up to $90
million dollars in revenue annually.103 As Las Vegas visionary Steve Wynn
observed when opening Encore, “money from gambling had been maybe ‘the
best cash register in [casinos] until the clubs came along.’”104
“The shift in revenue” away from gaming to clubs “began after the 1989
opening of The Mirage and the property’s mix of non-gaming [entertainment
and dining] offerings.”105 Then, in the 1990s Las Vegas experienced a
construction boom that produced the opening of the MGM Grand, Bellagio,
Venetian and Paris, among other mega-resorts and the introduction of high-end
restaurants and nightclubs.106
The most successful part of Las Vegas’ reinvented “image was the creation
of super hip, sexy nightclubs.”107 Through the application of cutting edge
entertainment, sex appeal, insanely expensive bar tabs, and successful
marketing, Las Vegas created a brand that brought 20 and 30-somethings into
town who were willing to drop hundreds of thousands of dollars to party in
these over-the-top clubs to “[look] for love, or at least, love for one [] night,” as
much they were to blow money at the casino tables.108 Successful casino
operators understand that the divergent shift is “a sign in the change of tastes of
the younger generation” that does not want to be the audience, rather they want
be part of the show instead—the actors.109
Thus, in the shadow of the last recession and steadily declining gaming
revenue, casinos, through the promotion of these nightclubs, “have created a
business model that has sustained investors even during” economic
adversity.110 Casino management, skeptical at first about the shift of focus
from gaming to nightclubs, couldn’t help but notice that the numbers showed
that nightclubs “were making more money per square foot than gambling
devices.”111 “During the heart of the recession, when overall Strip revenues
tumbled by 16 percent, nightclubs saw more profit than ever”—becoming ever
more important to the casinos’ bottom line.112 For example, “[h]alf of Steve
Wynn’s profit comes from [his casinos’] nightclubs.”113 As a result, in order to

Kim, supra note 1; Dreier, supra note 94.
Lapan, supra note 96.
105
Berns & Ryan, supra note 92.
106
Id.
107
David Sheldon, Las Vegas Nightclubs Pose Dark Threat to Tourists Via
Predator Drugs, CASINO.ORG (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.casino.org/news/lasvegas-nightclubs-pose-dark-threat-to-tourists-via-predator-drugs.
108
Id.; see Powers, supra note 97;
109
Lapan, supra note 96.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Daily Mail Nightclub Article, supra note 15.
113
Josh Eells, Night Club Royale, NEW YORKER (Sep. 30, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/night-club-royale.
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maximize casino revenue, casinos began “tearing out slot machines and felt
table[] [games] in favor of nightclubs.”114
3. Interdependence of Gaming and Nightclubs
Clearly, these clubs, if operated correctly, are tremendous money magnets.
Accordingly, through the use of “extravagantly paid DJs, larger-than-life
venues, billboard ads that stretch beyond the Strip to Hollywood Boulevard and
Miami” to attract the younger extravagant spenders into their clubs, casinos are
trying to maximize their revenue by integrating their nightclubs into their
gaming entertainment and dining facilities.115
To capitalize on the clubs, casinos snake waiting queues past well-traveled
areas—table games, slot machines, and restaurant corridors.116 Thus, because
“club[s] may see 8,000 people come and go over the course of a night[,]”
casinos create a lot of calculated foot traffic through their tempting slot
machines and table games.117 Additionally, some casinos have placed table
games inside the nightclubs to offer an all-around adult playground complete
with drinks, gambling, and world renowned DJs.118
Although nightclubs and non-gaming components, such as dining, are huge
draws that bring in the customers, casinos cannot survive without gaming
revenue. A prime example is the Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas that opened in
2010.119 The Cosmopolitan focused on “stylish features, spacious rooms,
signature restaurants”, and, of course, the mega-club.120 However, the
Cosmopolitan short-changed the casino by limiting its table games and slot
machine operations.121 As a result, “[t]he property hasn’t made much
money.”122 Specifically, during its first year of operation, “[i]t lost $19.4
million in the third quarter, following a $25.2 million loss in the second
quarter.”123
Ultimately, although gaming revenue is declining in Las Vegas, and
nightclub revenue generates approximately 10–14 percent of overall casino
revenue, casinos still take a very serious approach to providing customers with
a high-level gaming platform.124 The casinos’ efforts going forward are to keep
Lapan, supra note 96.
See Daily Mail Nightclub Article, supra note 15.
116
Id.
117
Dreier, supra note 94.
118
Id.
119
Howard Stutz, SLS Aims to Avoid Cosmo’s Mistakes, ONLINE POKER REP. (Dec.
16, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.onlinepokerreport.com/9688/sls-tries-not-torepeat-cosmos-mistakes/.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Marc Meltz, Nightclub Revenue in Vegas Will Shock You, EDGE VEGAS (Oct.
114
115
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Las Vegas relevant to both the millennial generation and the tenured visitors
who still look forward to the chance to win big on the one-arm bandits.125 Thus,
while casinos continue to push the envelope on creating the next mega-club,
casinos are also trying to increase the odds that millennials will gamble by
branding slot machines with popular TV and movie titles, and formatting video
poker to look more like a video game.126
As one casino executive succinctly stated, “a dollar is a dollar” and it
doesn’t matter “if a customer comes for a weekend of gambling or if they’re
doing other things, as long as they’re spending money.”127 Ultimately, in the
midst of the grand nightclub party, news about expansive illegal conduct that
was attracted to Las Vegas’ new casino business model caught the attention of
the agency appointed to protect Nevada’s gaming image and Nevada’s
dependent economy—Nevada’s Gaming Control Board.128
4. Nightclubs Gone Wild
Creating and managing a popular Las Vegas nightclub “requires the deft
and daring skill of operating a party environment that almost crosses the line
into illegal activity.”129 “Anything less would be considered too tame to
generate a buzz.”130 However, with the rise of the lucrative nightclubs, casinos
and nightclubs are turning a blind eye and even enabling illegal activity to
occur in the nightclubs. In fact, authorities are witnessing, at an alarming rate,
an increase in prostitution, narcotic crimes, human trafficking, and fatal
shootings that are attached to these popular venues.131 With over fifty clubs
operating in Las Vegas and new additions coming all the time, the issue has
become intensified as the illegal conduct is spilling out of the nightclubs and

28, 2014), http://edgevegas.com/nightclub-revenue-vegas-will-shock/; Stutz, supra
note 119.
125
Gambling Isn’t a Sure Bet, supra note 93.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See infra II.C.1.
129
Liz Benston, Is the Party Over for Prive?, L.V. SUN (Jul. 29, 2009, 2:00 AM),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jul/29/party-over-prive/.
130
Id.
131
Ashley Powers, Clubs Gone Wild: Vegas Tries to Rein in Anything-Goes
Nightclubs, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-0921/news/0909210188_1_las-vegas-strip-pool-club-planet-hollywood;
Powers,
supra note 97; see also Tom Ragan, Nevada Movement Draws the Line on Human
Trafficking, L.V. REV.-J. (May 29, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com
/news/las-vegas/nevada-movement-draws-line-human-trafficking (detailing human
trafficking concerns in nightclubs); Francis McCabe, Man Indicted in Fatal
Shooting at Drai’s Nightclub, L.V. REV.-J. (Nov. 22, 2013, 4:23 PM),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/man-indicted-fatal-shooting-drais-nightclub
(discussing fatal shooting at Las Vegas nightclub).
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into the casinos.132 In the face of this growing issue, the Board became
involved because the criminal activity began affecting the safety of nightclub
employees, tourists, casinos, and the integrity of Nevada’s gaming industry as a
whole.133
C. Nevada Gaming Control Board Oversight
1. The Board’s Crackdown
The Board is normally known for regulating casinos on improper gaming
conduct in its conventional form, such as failing to file some Internal Revenue
Service currency transaction records, money laundering activities, or
bookkeeping and slot machine accounting errors.134 However, with the ascent
of the mega-clubs and their ever-increasing importance and interrelatedness to
the revenue for casinos and the state of Nevada, the Board has focused on the
conduct within nightclubs.135
Even though nightclubs, restaurants, and other third-party vendors in
casinos do not typically offer gambling, “the [Board] has the authority to
regulate activities there because of a broad mandate to enforce the legitimacy
and reputation of the gaming industry.”136 Accordingly, Board has levied
millions of dollars in fines against various nightclubs and their related casinos
in recent years.137 Indeed, to understand the Board’s authority, it is important to
understand the relationship between the casinos and the nightclubs.
2. Third-Party Vendors
Prior to Las Vegas’ recent transformation, casinos, operating as “gaming
licensees[,] commonly owned and operated all or most of their non-gaming
venues.”138 Now, casinos are removing themselves from the ownership and
operation of the non-gaming venues, including restaurants and nightclubs, and,
in turn, allowing third party vendors to take the reins instead.139 This shift in the
casinos’ operational model creates an interesting situation in terms of the
Board’s regulatory abilities.140 Specifically, the Board has the statutory and
regulatory authority over nightclubs directly owned by the casino; however,

See Dreier, supra note 94; Powers, supra note 97.
See Benstson, supra note 129; Powers, supra note 97.
134
See generally Howard Stutz, Inside Gaming: Fattest Fines Have Come in a
Flurry, CDC GAMING REPS. (Mar. 23, 2014, 9:35 AM), https://cdcgamingreports
.com/commentaries/inside-gaming-fattest-fines-have-come-in-a-flurry/.
135
See infra Part II.C.iii.
136
Benston, supra note 129.
137
See Stutz, supra note 134.
138
Glenn Light et al., supra note 11.
139
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See id.
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this authority generally does not extend to venues operated by third parties.141
To circumvent this limitation, the Board exerts control over third party vendors,
such as nightclubs, through its control over the casino licensees.142
i. Casino Liability for Third Party Non-Gaming Vendors
The Board is an administrative agency that the Nevada Legislature has
charged with the administration and enforcement of Nevada’s gaming laws as
established in Nevada’s gaming statutes and in the regulations of the Nevada
Gaming Commission (“Commission”).143 Generally, “the Board’s jurisdiction
is limited to gaming licensees and therefore has no direct authority to regulate
the conduct of non-gaming business operations”—third party vendors.144
However, the Nevada Legislature has expanded the Board’s powers far beyond
areas typically associated with the regulation of gaming and, thus, the Board
indirectly has the authority to regulate third party vendors such as nightclubs.145
Under Nevada’s gaming statutes, the Nevada Legislature has declared
Nevada’s public policy concerning gaming as follows:
The gaming industry is vitally important to the economy of [Nevada] and the
general welfare of [Nevada’s] inhabitants. The continued growth and success
of gaming is dependent upon public confidence and trust that licensed
gaming . . . [establishments are] free from criminal and corruptive elements.
Public confidence and trust can only be maintained by strict regulation of all
persons, locations, practices, associations and activities related to the
operation of licensed gaming establishments. . . . All establishments where
gaming is conducted and where gaming devices are operated . . . must
therefore be licensed, controlled and assisted to protect the public health,
safety, morals, good order and general welfare of the inhabitants of the State,
to foster the stability and success of gaming and to preserve the competitive
economy and policies of free competition of the State of Nevada.146

Thus, through the Nevada Legislature’s broad mandate for the Board to
protect the public health, safety, morals, good order, and general welfare of
Nevada’s citizens at all establishments where gaming is conducted, the Board
takes the position that gaming licensees and casinos are responsible for the

Id.
Id.
143
Complaint at 1, State Gaming Control Bd. v. FP Holdings, L.P., NGC 12-07
(Nev. Gaming Comm’n, Jan. 11, 2013), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/show
document.aspx?documentid=7506.
144
Dorn, supra note 19, at 38.
145
Id. at 38–39.
146
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129 (2015). This stance is echoed in the Nevada
Gaming Commission’s regulations. Operations of Gaming Establishments, Nev.
Gaming Comm’n Reg. 5.010(1) (2015) (“It is the policy of the commission and the
board to require that all establishments wherein gaming is conducted in this state be
operated in a manner suitable to protect the public health, safety, morals, good
order and general welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Nevada.”).
141
142
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conduct of third parties with operations on casino property.147
The Board fortifies its stance that it has the authority to commence a
disciplinary proceeding against a casino licensee for the conduct of a third party
through the application of the Commission’s regulations.148 The Commission’s
regulations, enforced by the Board, promulgate that any method of operation on
behalf of the casino licensee that the Board deems “unsuitable will constitute
grounds for license revocation or other disciplinary action.”149 In addition, the
Commission’s regulations declare that the Board will administer disciplinary
action against a casino licensee if the casino permits “any type of conduct in the
gaming establishment which reflects or tends to reflect [negatively on the
reputation] of the State of Nevada and act as a detriment to the gaming
industry.150 Accordingly, with the threat of losing its invaluable gaming license
due to the conduct of a third party vendor on the casino’s property that goes
against Nevada’s public policies, a casino maintains the responsibility to
regulate any illegal conduct that transpires on its property, regardless if the
venue is managed by a third party.
However, casinos, seeing a sharp increase in revenues related to the
nightclub industry, did not take any corrective actions when drugs and
prostitution became a semi-permanent fixture in the nightclub industry.151
Thus, starting in 2006, the Board, through the use of “industry letters,” began
notifying casino licensees about their responsibility for the third party vendors
on their properties.152
ii. Industry Letters
Over the stretch of six years, the Board sent letters, and conducted
awareness classes, to casino licensees regarding the illegal activities within
nightclubs and informed the casino licensees about their responsibility under
the Nevada Revised Statutes and Gaming Regulations for the conduct that
transpired at these nightclub venues.
On February 7, 2006, the Board sent a letter to casino licensees concerning

Dorn, supra note 19, at 38.
Id.
149
Reg. 5.010(2).
150
Operations of Gaming Establishments, Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 5.011(10)
(2015). The Commission defines an establishment as, “any premises where
business is conducted, and includes all buildings, improvements, equipment and
facilities used or maintained in connection with such business.” Issuance of
Regulations: Construction; Definitions, Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 1.110 (2015).
Furthermore, the Commission defines premises as, “land together with all
buildings, improvements and personal property located thereon.” Issuance of
Regulations: Construction; Definitions, Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 1.145 (2016).
151
See infra Part II.B.4..
152
See infra Part II.C.2.ii.
147
148

LOFTUS FINAL FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

268

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

10/31/2016 4:21 PM

[Vol. 6:248

the increasing problems related to nightclub activities.153 In its letter, the Board
expressed concern about “incidences of excessive inebriation, drug distribution
and abuse, violence, the involvement of minors, and the handling of those
individuals who become incapacitated while at the club.”154 The Board
concluded its letter by advising casino licensees that whether the nightclubs
were owned by the casino or by third party vendors, the Board would hold the
casino licensees accountable for any regulatory violations that occurred within
or outside a nightclub located on the casino licensee’s property.155
Thereafter, on April 9, 2009, in response to complaints about the conduct
transpiring at the nightclubs, the Board sent casino licensees a reminder of the
licensees’ responsibilities for the venues.156 In addition to the previous
concerns addressed in the 2006 letter, the Board expanded the list of wrongful
conduct to include: “excessive inebriation; drug distribution and abuse;
violence; overt sexual acts in public areas; acts deemed lewd, indecent or
obscene; presence of minors; mishandling of incapacitated individuals
(“dumping”); date rape, extortion/misquoting of service charges; restricted
access by law enforcement; lack of coordination with licensee security; and
prostitution.”157 The Board also reaffirmed its stance that it is the Nevada
casino “licensees’ responsibility to ensure operations conducted within the
boundaries of their property are run in accordance with all laws and regulations
and in a manner that does not reflect badly on the State of Nevada or its gaming
industry.”158
On April 9, 2012, the Board, in preparation for upcoming pool parties at
day clubs, reached out to the casino licensees once again.159 The Board
reviewed the illegal conduct that was taking place within the nightclubs and,
once again, informed the casino licensees that “[r]egardless of the association
or contractual agreement between the licensee, a lessee or a third party
operator/manager; it remains the responsibility of the licensee to ensure
operations conducted on its premises are run in accordance with all local, state
and federal laws and gaming regulations.”160
Memorandum from the State of Nev. Gaming Control Bd. to all Nonrestricted
Licensees and Interested Persons (Feb. 7, 2006), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi
/abs/10.1089/glre.2010.14103?journalCode=glre.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Memorandum from Randall E Sayre, Member, State of Nev. Gaming Control
Bd. to all Nonrestricted Licensees and Interested Parties (April 9, 2009),
http://gaming.nv.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=5377.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Notice from Mark A. Lipparelli, Chairman, Gaming Control Bd. & Douglas C.
Gillespie, Sheriff, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t to All Nonrestricted Licensees
and Interested Parties (Apr. 9, 2012), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument
.aspx?documentid=3451.
160
Id.
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Thus, the Board made it known to casino licensees that regardless of
whether the nightclubs were owned and operated by the casino or by a third
party vendor, the Board was going to hold casino responsible for the conduct
that transpired in nightclubs that operated on casino premises.
3. Casinos and Nightclubs Subjected to Board’s Oversight
i. Planet Hollywood
After the Board began issuing its industry letters, in 2009, it began
investigating the activities that were occurring within Las Vegas nightclubs.161
The Board set their sights on Prive, a popular nightclub that was located within
the Planet Hollywood casino, after the Board received a letter from a former
employee that stated the nightclub was involved in illegal narcotic and
prostitution activities and was serving alcohol to underage girls.162 The Board’s
investigations unveiled that big spenders were allowed to use drugs and
participate in illegal sexual activities because of the money that they were
spending in the club.163 Essentially, the more money a patron spent, the more
illegal activity Prive’s management would allow. In fact, Prive’s management
would prevent Prive’s security from removing cash-laden patrons regardless of
whether the patrons were involved in illegal conduct.164
“Allegations of underage drinking, drug use and prostitution are all part of
the underground reputation of popular, big-city nightclubs—though former
employees say Prive [was] unusual, even in the liberal nightclub world,
because management cultivated such behavior.”165 Accordingly, in an
unprecedented enforcement action against Planet Hollywood for allowing the
Prive nightclub to run wild, the Board slapped the casino with a $500,000
fine.166 The issue, especially after the multiple cautionary letters distributed by
the Board, was that Planet Hollywood knew that Prive was conducting illegal
activities and condoning behaviors that were against Nevada’s public policy,
and yet allowed such conduct to continue.167
In response to the Board’s regulatory actions, Prive temporarily closed its
doors and Planet Hollywood held reform discussions with Prive’s
management.168 As a result of what became referred to as “Prive-gate,” casinos

See Benston, supra note 129.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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Id.
168
See Steve Green, Privé Losing its Lease at Planet Hollywood, L.V. SUN (Apr. 8,
2010, 4:26 PM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2010/apr/08/lease-problems-planethollywood/.
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tightened their nightclub operations after realizing the Board meant to enforce
its stance of holding casino licensees responsible for the illegal conduct that
transpired within the clubs on their premises.169
ii. Hard Rock and Palms
In 2011, the Board went after the Hard Rock Hotel for drug sales and
prostitution within its clubs.170 The Board, in sending another message to the
industry about its stance of stamping out the illegal conduct in Las Vegas’
nightclubs, fined the Hard Rock $650,000.171 However, this message was short
lived, as two years later, in 2013, the Board went after the Palms Casino for the
same drug and prostitution issues.172
The problem, as one commentator put it, is that
“[i]t’s folly to think properties can stop customers from engaging in illicit sex
and drug use when there’s no shortage of supply or demand for them.
Prohibition didn’t stop alcohol use and gambling, and it won’t stop
prostitution or drugs, either. But when the dealers and pimps are hotel
employees, it crosses a line that threatens the reputation of the entire industry.
Nevada worked hard for decades to rid its casinos of criminals and build its
brand as an above-board, well-regulated destination for safe, lawful fun. Once
the criminal element takes root within a hotel’s workforce, it inevitably
spreads until it victimizes visitors . . . .”173

iii. Mandalay Bay
As if the multiple six figure fines were not enough to put the casino
licensees on notice to monitor the illegal conduct within their nightclubs, in
2014, the Board fined Mandalay Bay for Mandalay Bay’s problems of illicit
drugs and prostitution its nightclubs venues.174 Specifically, the Board fined
Mandalay Bay $500,000 after an investigation revealed that employees

See Benston, supra note 129.
Chris Sieroty, $650,000 Settlement with Hard Rock Hotel Approved, L.V. REV.J. (Jan. 27, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/casinosgaming/650000-settlement-hard-rock-hotel-approved.
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Sex, Drugs and Clubs, L.V. REV.-J. OPINION (Jan. 17, 2013, 2:04 AM),
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provided drugs and prostitution services to undercover cops.175 Authorities say
undercover officers bought cocaine, ecstasy and other drugs from employees of
the House of Blues’ Foundation Room, which is located in the Mandalay Bay,
over the summer of 2012.176 The Board’s partnership with local police was
similar to the conduct of the sting against the Palms.177
Thus, in viewing these examples of the Board’s recent regulatory actions, it
is apparent that the Board has authority to conduct investigations into the illegal
conduct that transpires within a casino licensees’ nightclub, even nightclubs of
third party vendors, and hold the respective casino licensee responsible for any
illegal conduct that transpires therein.
III. CONCLUSION
The Nevada Supreme Court made it clear in Schlang, that in order to
receive whistleblower protections under Nevada’s common law, the employee,
among other elements, must affirmatively report her employer’s illegal conduct
to a proper external authority, a government agency charged with regulating the
respective illegal conduct. However, as the casino business model in Las Vegas
has changed from that of gaming to that of an interdependent gaming and
nightclub model, the Board has made it known through its industry letters as
well as its enforcement actions that it has the power to regulate the everpopular nightclubs. However, although the Board can regulate the illegal
conduct that transpires within the nightclubs, does the Board qualify under
Schlang as a proper external agency for whistleblower protections if a
nightclub employee reports her employer’s illegal conduct to the Board?
The answer appears more certain for nightclubs that are owned directly by
the casino licensees. Under the direct ownership model, the casino as a whole is
under the Board’s oversight and, thus, the Board would be the agency that
enforces any conduct that is violative of Nevada’s public policy. Accordingly,
if an employee of a casino-owned nightclub notified the Board that the
nightclub was participating in conduct that was violative of Nevada’s public
policy, that employee would likely be protected under the Nevada’s common
law whistleblower protections as the employee notified a proper external
government agency.
Nightclubs owned or operated by third party vendors, however, do not fall
directly under the Board’s regulatory oversight. As addressed above, though,
the Board indirectly regulates the activity that occurs within these nightclubs by
holding the casino licensees responsible for the third party vendors. Here,
unlike Schlang, where the employee reported the employer’s misconduct to a
completely unrelated governmental agency that had no ability at all to act upon
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the employee’s allegations, the Board, through broad mandates, has the ability
to address conduct that is violative of Nevada’s public policies, even if the
nightclub is owned by a third party vendor. Thus, if an employee of third party
vendor reports her employer’s misconduct to the Board, the Nevada courts
should consider her actions in line with Schlang and, therefore, she should be
protected under Nevada’s common law whistleblower protections.

